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struggle among agnostics, materialists, and idealists, with "each major
type of philosophy" being regarded as "a partial revelation of reality."
The concludingbrief chapter on "Scholarand Poet" hardly clarifiesmatters by such statements as: "A finding of science and a work of art are
alike in origin. They are alike in the test of their truth and worth..... The
supreme test for what each man reports is the judgment of those who
come nearest to sharing his judgment" (pp. I29-30).
President Bryan
ends his lectures with an autobiographicalnote in the form of a summingup of "the chief of what I have seen. I have had sight of chaos and hell,
but also, on every side, I have seen the irrepressibleemergence of order,
reason, beauty, love." It may well be that others will develop further,
and more systematically, his notion of human temperaments and their
demands as forming something like "families of minds."
HAROLD A. LARRABEE

Union College
! By
WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS
cock, I939. Pp. Xi+274.

Fred Rodell. New York: Reynal & Hitch-

The following excerpts from the above book indicate the general tenor
of the author's thesis:
Of courseany lawyerwillbristle,or snortwith derision,at the ideathat what
he dealsin is words. He deals,he will tell you, in propositions,concepts,fundamentalprinciples-in short,in ideas (p. 9). Oncebroughtdownto earth,once
appliedto physicalfacts, the abstractionsbecomenothingbut words-words
by whichlawyersdescribe,and justify,the thingsthat lawyersdo (p. io). The
legal trade, in short, is nothing but a high-class racket (p. Is). Considerationand every other so-called concept or principle of The Law-amounts to a vague
legal way of stating a result, applied to the result after the result is reached,
instead of being, as the lawyers and judges stoutly pretend, a reason for reaching
the result in the first place (p. 55-56). But even when the nine master jugglers
[United States Supreme Court] are working at their smoothest, it requires only
a trained eye to see that those weighty thoughts they seem to be tossing around
are in reality no more than balloons, full of hot air and easily punctured (p. I3 I) .
They balance-don't laugh-one set of abstract principles against another and,
through some sort of trance-like transference, come out with a specific decision.
They take the long words and sonorous phrases of The Law, no matter how
ambiguous or empty of meaning, no matter how contradictory of each other;
they weigh these words and phrases in a vacuum-which is the only way they
could be weighed; and then they "apply" the weightier to the dispute in question with all the finality that might be accorded a straight wire from God (p.
The sober truth is that the myriad principles of which The Law is
I52-53).
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fashionedresemblenothingso much as old saws, dressedup in legal language
and paradedas gospel. When Justice Marshallintoned "The power to tax
involvesthe powerto destroy,"and on the basisof that principledeclaredthat
a certainstate tax was illegal,he might just as well have said "Greatoaksfrom
little acornsgrow"and foundedhis decisionon that-except that he wouldnot
have soundedquite so impressive(p. i65). The jokerin the theoryis the assumptionthat any two, muchless twenty, fact situationsor legalproblemscan
ever be sufficientlyalike to fall naturally-that is, without being pushedinto the samecategory(p. i69). For if The Law werereallythe exact and impartialscienceit purportsto be, insteadof being an uncertainand imprecise
abracadabradevotedto the solemnmanipulationof a lot of silly abstractions,
none of these bases of inequalityand injusticewould,or could,exist (p. 245).
Sincecertaintyand consistencyare impossibleof attainmentin orderlycontrol
of men'saffairs,the sensiblething to do wouldseem to be to go straightafter
justice in the settlementof any specificquestionthat comes up for solution.
Now justiceitself is concededlyan amorphousand uncertainideal. Oneman's
Every writtenlaw-written, you
justiceis anotherman'spoison(pp. 25I-52).
language-might be entrustedto a body of techremember,in comprehensible
nical experts,to administerand apply it and make specificdecisionsunderit.
As the InterstateCommerceCommissionappliesthe InterstateCommerceAct,
as the FederalTradeCommissionappliesthe ClaytonAct, so each state would
have, say, a KillingCommissionto apply its laws about what are now called
murderand manslaughter(pp. 263-64).
The author has much talent and a facile style. His book has been
criticized so adversely that there is little point in adding to this consensus.
If his central argument is admitted, one must conclude that any rational
adjudication of disputes is impossible. For his espousal of arbitration and
decision by experts simply begs the entire question of the bases for such
"sound" solution. The book would have aroused little comment had it
been written by a journalist; the author is a professor of law, and one is
accordingly led to ask whether it is sensible to speak of "obligation" or
"responsibility" on the part of legal scholars and, indeed, of educated
persons generally. The revieweranswersthis question emphatically in the
affirmative-if ever there was a time when sound jurisprudencewas vital
to the preservation of civilization, however understood, the present is
assuredly that time. But such terms as "obligation," "scholar's responsibility" cannot be meaningful to the nominalistic, logical-positivistic
mentality of the author of this book. It is to be hoped that he will cultivate what common sense he has.
JEROME HALL

Indiana UniversityLaw School
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